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No PRP Left Behind: The Tenth Circuit Allows Non-Settling PRPs to
Intervene as of Right in CERCLA Consent Decree Actions
United States v. Albert Investment Co.'
I. INTRODUCTION

When potentially responsible parties ("PRPs") settle with the
government over CERCLA response costs,2 the settling parties obtain
immunity from any related contribution claims that might otherwise be
brought against them. Because such settlements foreclose non-settling
PRPs' contribution rights under CERCLA, the non-settling PRPs often
seek to intervene in the settlement actions to oppose the proposed consent
decrees and prevent potentially inequitable cost allocations. The federal
courts have struggled for decades to determine whether non-settling PRPs
may intervene as of right 3 in CERCLA consent decree actions between the
government and settling PRPs. Historically, most courts have held that
non-settling PRPs do not have a right to intervene in such cases. 4

' 585 F.3d 1386 (10thCir. 2009).
2 For a brief explanation of response costs under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), see infra Part III.A, note 41
and accompanying text.
3Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 provides for two types of intervention: intervention
as of right and permissive intervention. The court must permit anyone to intervene who
meets the requirements for intervention as of right. Under permissive intervention, the
court may exercise its discretion in determining whether to permit a person to intervene.
4 See, e.g., United States v. Acorn Eng'g Co., 221 F.R.D. 530, 534 (C.D. Cal. 2004);
United States v. ABC Indus., 153 F.R.D. 603, 607 (W.D. Mich. 1993); United States v.
Wheeling Disposal Serv., Inc., No. 92-0132, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22425, *4 (W.D.
Mo. Oct. 1, 1992); Arizona v. Motorola, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 141, 146 (D. Ariz. 1991);
United States v. Beazer East, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21436 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 6,
1991). Other cases contain dicta supporting the view that a non-settling PRP may not
intervene as of right for lack of a legally protectable interest in its contribution claims
against settling PRPs. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Inc., 25 F.3d 1174, 1184
(3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Mid-State Disposal, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 573, 577 (W.D.
Wis. 1990); see also Adam Orford, Break on Through: Tenth CircuitAllows Non-Settling
PRP to Intervene in CERCLA Settlement Proceedings,MARTEN LAW ENVIRONMENTAL
NEWS, Dec. 23, 2009, http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20091223-non-settling-prpintervention.
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However, the courts that have so held are all district courts. 5 The circuit
courts of appeal that have confronted the issue have held that non-settling
PRPs do have a right to intervene. 6 With its opinion in United States v.
Albert Inv. Co., the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals joined the Eighth
Circuit 7 in allowing non-settling PRPs to intervene as of right in CERCLA
lawsuits in order to protect their contribution claims against the settling
PRPs. Recently, the Ninth Circuit followed suit in United States v.
Aerojet General Corp., an opinion that adopted the reasoning developed
by the Eighth and Tenth Circuits. 9
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
A. The Double Eagle Superfund Site
The Double Eagle Refining Company and Double Eagle
Lubricants, Inc. (collectively "Double Eagle") leased a 12-acre lot from
successive railroad companies for the operation of a waste oil refining
facility.' 0 In the course of its operations, Double Eagle contaminated the
5See

example cases cited supra note 4. In addition, the Third Circuit has indicated in
dicta that it would decline to extend the right of intervention to non-settling PRPs. Alcan
Aluminum, Inc., 25 F.3d at 1184 ("Where the proposed intervenor has not yet settled with
the government, it is unclear what, if any liability, it will have. Thus, any contribution
right it might have depends on the outcome of some future dispute in which the applicant
may, or may not, be assigned a portion of liability. In that situation, courts have properly
found the interest of non-settlor applicants to be merely contingent."). For a discussion
of Alcan Aluminum, Inc. and related precedent, see infra Part III.C, note 64 and
accompanying text.
6 United States v. Aerojet General Corp., 606 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2010); Albert Inv. Co.,
585 F.3d at 1386 (10th Cir.); United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152 (8th Cir.
1995).
See Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152.
8 See AlbertInv. Co., 585 F.3d at 1386. Other district court decisions also support this
conclusion, including a recent decision by the Northern District of West Virginia that
discusses Albert Inv. Co. United States v. ExxonMobil Corp., 264 F.R.D. 242, 246-47;
see also, e.g., United States v. ExxonMobil Corp., No. 07-60, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
95463 (D.N.H. Dec. 20, 2007); United States v. City of Glen Cove, 221 F.R.D. 370
(E.D.N.Y. 2004); United States v. Acton Corp., 131 F.R.D. 431, 434 (D.N.J. 1990).
9
Aerojet Gen. Corp., 606 F.3d at 1150-53.
'0 AlbertInv. Co., 585 F.3d at 1389.
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property with hazardous waste." The Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") placed the property on the National Priorities List in 1989 and the
site became known as the Double Eagle Superfund Site ("the Site").12
From 1989 to 1999, EPA and the Oklahoma Department of Environmental
Quality ("ODEQ") expended over $30 million remediating surface and
groundwater contamination at the Site.' 3
B. Cost Recovery Action against Union Pacific

Through a series of mergers,14 the Union Pacific Railroad
Company ("Union Pacific") acquired title to the Site in 2003. In 2006, the
United States and the State of Oklahoma ("the government") filed a
CERCLA15 cost recovery suit against Union Pacific for "unreimbursed
cleanup costs and natural resources damages" associated with the Site.' 6
In that suit, which is still pending, the government seeks to hold Union
Pacific jointly and severally liable for the entire damages from the Site.' 7
C. Cost Recovery Action againstthe Settling PRPs

The government filed a separate cost recovery action in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma against fortyfive additional parties' 8 potentially responsible for contamination at the

"1
12 Id
13

d
id

14 The Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company originally owned the lot and leased it
to Double Eagle. Id. In 1989, the Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company merged
with the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company. Id. The Missouri Pacific Railroad
Company continued to lease the property to Double Eagle. Id. In 2003, the Missouri
Pacific Railroad Company merged with the Union Pacific Railroad Company. Id.
15 CERCLA stands for the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, more commonly known as "Superfund." See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(2006).
'6 Albert Inv. Co., 585 F.3d at 1389.
18 The

court's opinion states there were forty-four defendants-appellees, id. at 1390, but
the case caption lists forty-five defendants-appellees. Id. at 1386-87.
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Site. 19 Those parties are Defendants-Appellees in the instant case.2 o The
government sought reimbursement for the entire damages from these
parties, as well. 2 1 Within a week of filing suit, and despite the fact that the
statute of limitations on the government's "friendly suit" 22 had already
expired, the government lodged a consent decree on June 27, 2008,
memorializing its settlement agreement with the PRPs.23 As part of the
nearly $6.5 million settlement, the PRPs would receive immunity from
contribution claims arising out of the Site. 2 4 This immunity would bar
Union Pacific from recovering any of its costs from the PRPs. The
proposed consent decree was subject to a thirty-day notice and comment
period, during which Union Pacific filed the only comments in
opposition. 25

19 Id. at 1390. The parties are Albert Investment Company, Inc.; American Airlines, Inc.;
Apac Arkansas, Inc.; Apac Oklahoma, Inc.; Bartlett Collins Company; Bell Helicopter;
Bridgestone/Firestone North American Tire, LLC; Butler Aviation; CNH America LLC,
f/k/a Case Corporation; Chevron Environmental Management Company; City of
Amarillo; City of Oklahoma City; City of Tulsa; ConocoPhillips Company; CRST
International, Inc.; Cummins Southern Plains, Inc.; Schlumberger Technologies
Corporation Dowell Schlumberger; Emerson Electric Company; Fibercast; Ft. James
Operating Company; General Tire, Inc.; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company; Halliburton;
Howard Pontiac GMC, Inc.; Hudiberg Chevrolet, d/b/a Hudiberg Investments; Illinois
Tool Works, Inc.; IMCO d/b/a General Dynamics OTS, f/k/a Intercontinental
Manufacturing Company, Inc.; Kawneer Company, Inc.; Marathon Electric; Natural Gas
Pipeline; Oklahoma Department of Mental Health; Oklahoma Department of
Transportation; Roadway Express, Inc.; Sears Roebuck and Company; Shell Oil
Company; BC Imports, Inc., f/k/a Steve Bailey Honda; UE, Inc. f/k/a United Engines,
Inc.; United Parcel Service, Inc.; Western Farmers; Willis Shaw Express, Inc.; Hilti, Inc.;
Interstate Brands Continental Baking; Tyson Foods, Inc.; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.; and
Kraft
General Foods, Inc. Id. at 1386-87.
20
Id. at 1390.
21 id.
22 A friendly suit is "a lawsuit brought solely for the purpose of settlement." Orford,
supra note 4, at Background Section.
23
Id.; Notice of Lodging of Consent Decree Under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 41,118 (Dep't of Justice July
17, 2008) (indicating the date the proposed consent decree was filed).
24
Albert Inv. Co., 585 F.3d at 1390.
25 id

125

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., VOL. 18, No. 1
On October 10, 2008, Union Pacific moved to intervene in the
government's cost recovery suit against the PRPs. 26 Union Pacific
claimed intervention as of right 27 or, in the alternative, permissive
intervention.28 Union Pacific argued that it had a significant interest in

pursuing contribution claims against the settling PRPs and that the
proposed consent decree would extinguish its opportunity to protect that
interest. 29 The government and the settling PRPs opposed Union Pacific's
motion. 30
The district court denied Union Pacific's motion to intervene. 3 1
The court held that Union Pacific's interest was not legally sufficient to
justify intervention as of right. 32 The court also refused to grant Union
Pacific permissive intervention, citing concerns that "permitting Union
Pacific to intervene at this stage would unduly delay the settlement and
would prejudice the rights of Plaintiffs and Defendants." 33
D. The Appeal
Union Pacific appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 34
which reversed, 5 holding that Union Pacific's contribution rights
constituted an interest sufficient to trigger intervention as of right.36 The
Court found that Union Pacific met the four requirements of intervention
as of right: (1) its motion to intervene was timely, 37 (2) its contribution
rights against the settling PRPs constituted a legally sufficient interest, 3 8
26 id
27
28
29

See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
Albert Inv. Co., 585 F.3d at 1390; see FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(A).
Albert Inv. Co., 585 F.3d at 1390.

30
1d
31

id.
Id In reviewing the legislative history of CERCLA § 113(i), the district court
concluded that Congress specifically intended to exclude non-settling PRPs from
intervening to protect their contribution interests. Id. at 1392.
33
1Id at 1390.
34
id.
35
1Id at 1399.
32

31Id at 1397.
3

1Id at 1392.
Id at 1397.
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(3) that interest would be impaired by the approval of the consent
decree, 39 and (4) its interests were not adequately represented by the
existing parties to the lawsuit.4 0
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. CERCLA
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA) was originally enacted in 1980 and was
subsequently amended in 1986.41 The Act empowers EPA to remediate
hazardous waste sites using monies from the Superfund. 42 CERCLA also
provides a cost recovery framework designed to reimburse the Superfund
and allocate cleanup costs to the parties who are potentially responsible
for the contamination, when possible. 43 CERCLA contains two cost
recovery mechanisms. The first, CERCLA § 107, "authorizes private
parties and state and federal governments to recover costs of a cleanup"
from PRPs.4 In the instant case, the government's lawsuit against the
settling PRPs was a § 107 claim.4 5 The second mechanism, CERCLA
§ 113, allows a PRP subject to liability under a §107 claim to seek
contribution from "any other person who is liable or potentially liable
under section [107]."46
At issue in this case was the potential
extinguishment of Union Pacific's right to seek contribution from the
settling PRPs under § 113.47
9
Id. at
40

1399.
Id. Because the court held that Union Pacific could intervene as of right, it did not
address the district court's denial of Union Pacific's motion for permissive intervention.
Id.
4 U.S. EPA, CERCLA Overview, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/cercla.htm (last
visited Nov. 10, 2010).
42

id

43 U.S. EPA, Summary of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,

and Liability Act (Superfund), http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/cercla.html (last visited
Nov. 10, 2010).
4 Albert Inv. Co., 585 F.3d at 1391 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006)).
45

id

"Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1)).
47

d.
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B. Intervention

To preserve this contribution right, Union Pacific moved to
intervene in the lawsuit that generated the proposed consent decree.4 8
Generally, intervention is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24.
Rule 24 contains two mechanisms: intervention of right and permissive
intervention. 49 For intervention of right under Rule 24(a),
the court must permit anyone to intervene who: (1) is given
an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or
(2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that
disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or
impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless
existing parties adequately represent that interest.50
The standard of Rule 24(a)(2) governs in the instant case. 5 I From
Rule 24(a), the courts have elucidated four requirements for intervention
as of right: "(1) the application is timely; (2) the applicant claims an
interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the
action; (3) the applicant's interest may as a practical matter be impaired or
impeded; and (4) the applicant's interest is not adequately represented by
existing parties."5 2 The movant carries the burden of proof for all four
elements.

48

1d.at 1390.
R. CIv. P. 24.
FED. R. CIv. P. 24(a) (emphasis added). A person who does not qualify for

49
FED.
50

intervention of right may request the court's permission to intervene under Rule 24(b).
s See Albert Inv. Co., 585 F.3d at 1390 ("On October 10, 2008, Union Pacific filed
a
motion to intervene as of right in the underlying action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
24(a)(2).").
52 Id. at 1391 (quoting Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246, 1249 (10th Cir.
2001)).
s3 See id. at 1392; see also United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152, 1157 (8th Cir.
1995) ("[T]he intervenor bears the burden of showing inadequate representation by
existing parties under Rule 24(a)(2).").
128
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CERCLA also contains a provision establishing intervention as of
right in CERCLA lawsuits. 54 This provision is "nearly identical" to
Rule 24(a)(2)." Section 113(i) provides that
[i]n

any

action

commenced

under

this

chapter

[CERCLA] . . . in a court of the United States, any person

may intervene as a matter of right when such person claims
an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practical
matter, impair or impede the person's ability to protect that
interest, unless the President or the State shows that the
person's interest is adequately represented by existing
parties. 56
The only difference between Rule 24(a)(2) intervention and CERCLA
§ 113(i) intervention is the burden of proof regarding the fourth element:
that the existing parties do not represent the movant's interests.5 7 Under
the Federal Rules, the movant must establish this element; under
CERCLA, the burden falls on the State.5 8
The Tenth Circuit has developed standards to determine what
interests are legally sufficient to give rise to intervention as of right. In
San Juan County v. United States,59 the court laid down its "practical
judgment standard" for determining what constitutes sufficient interest.6 0
In that case, the court held that "at [a] minimum, '[t]he applicant must
have an interest that could be adversely affected by the litigation. But
practical judgment must be applied in determining whether the strength of
the interest and the potential risk of injury to that interest justify

54

42 U.S.C. § 9613(i) (2006).

ss Albert Inv. Co., 585 F.3d at 1391.
5642 U.S.C. § 9613(i).
" Albert Inv. Co., 585 F.3d at 1392; Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1157 ("[T]he intervenor
bears the burden of showing inadequate representation by existing parties under Rule
24(a)(2).").
" 8Albert Inv. Co., 585 F.3d at 1392.
5 503 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
6 See Albert Inv. Co., 585 F.3d at 1392.
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intervention."' 6 1 In WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Service,62 the
court applied the practical standard to economic interests, holding that
"the threat of economic injury from the outcome of litigation undoubtedly
gives a petitioner the requisite interest."63
C. Split ofAuthority RegardingIntervention ofNon-Settling PRPs
There is a split of federal authority regarding whether non-settling
PRPs may intervene as of right in CERCLA settlements. The Eighth
Circuit has held that non-settling PRPs may intervene as of right. 64
However, the Third Circuit and various district courts have declined to
adopt the Eighth Circuit view, holding instead that non-settling PRPs do
not qualify for intervention by right. 65
In United States v. Union Elec. Co., the Eighth Circuit considered
a lawsuit similar to the instant case, wherein a group of non-settling PRPs
moved to intervene in the government's cost recovery suit to prevent the
lodging of a consent decree that would immunize the settling PRPs from
the non-settlors' potential contribution claims. The court reviewed two
conflicting precedents regarding whether the non-settlors were entitled to
intervention by right. First, the court considered the "majority" position
epitomized by dicta of the Third Circuit in United States v. Alcan
Aluminum, Inc. 66 and various district court decisions67 that non-settling
PRPs may not intervene by right.6 In Alcan, the Third Circuit considered
the policy goals underlying CERCLA and legislative intent to determine
whether to grant intervention as of right. The Third Circuit-as well as
the district courts following this analytical theory-ultimately concluded
Id. (quoting San Juan County, 503 F.3d at 1199).
573 F.3d 992 (10th Cir. 2009).
Albert Inv. Co., 585 F.3d at 1392 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting WildEarth
Guardians,573 F.3d at 996).
6 Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1170.
65 United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Inc., 25 F.3d 1174, 1183-84 (3d Cir.
1994). See,
e.g., United States v. Acorn Eng'g Co., 221 F.R.D. 530, 533-34 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
* Alcan Aluminum, Inc., 25 F.3d at 1183-84.
67 See United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152, 1163-64 (8th Cir.) (giving
myriad
district court opinions tracking the Third Circuit's reasoning in Alcan).
68 Id. at 1170 (the court's
holding).

61

62
63
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that allowing intervention of right would be inconsistent with CERCLA's
goal of promoting early settlement. 69 "[A]llowing intervention to protect
contribution claims would result in parties refusing to enter into
meaningful settlement negotiations."70
Thus, these courts rejected
intervention by right for non-settling PRPs as contrary to CERCLA's
purpose.
The Eighth Circuit declined to apply this precedent, 7 electing
instead to adopt the reasoning of United States v. Acton Corp.72 In
analyzing CERCLA intervention, the Acton court refused to rely on policy
arguments and legislative history. 73 The court reasoned that such factors
are appropriately considered only when a statute is ambiguous. 74 Because
the Acton court found CERCLA's terms unambiguous, the court looked to
the plain meaning of the statutory language only.75 The Eighth Circuit
agreed, noting that while "Congress has identified a number of factors as
relevant to intervention in CERCLA litigation pursuant to § 113(i), policy
and legislative intent are not among them."76 The Eighth Circuit analyzed
the plain language of the statute: "CERCLA's intervention provisions
unambiguously provide for intervention by 'any person' when such person
meets the requirements of the statute." 77 Unlike the Alcan court, the
Eighth Circuit did not find intervention as of right by non-settlors to be
inconsistent with CERCLA's other provisions.7 8 The Eighth Circuit

69

Id. at 1163 (CERCLA expressly subordinates "contribution claims [to] the desire
for
early de minimis settlements and finality of settlement judgments."); Alcan Aluminum,
Inc., 25 F.3d at 1184 ("Our conclusion is in line with the policies behind the SARA
amendments. Congress amended CERCLA because it wanted to encourage early
settlement.").
70 Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1164 (discussing United States v. Vasi, 22 Chem. Waste
Lit. Rep. 218, 219 (N.D. Ohio 1991)).
71 Id.
n 131 F.R.D. 431 (D.N.J. 1990).
7 Union Electric Co., 64 F.3d at 1164 (citing Acton, 131 F.R.D. at 433).
74 Id. (citing Acton, 131 F.R.D. at 433).
7 Id. (citing Acton, 131 F.R.D. at 433-34).
76
Id. at 1166.
77
Id. at 1165 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9613(i) (2006)).
78

id.
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found no contradiction between allowing intervention under CERCLA
§ 113(i) and the purpose of § 113(f)(2) to promote prompt settlement. 79
There is no contradiction among these provisions requiring
resort to legislative intent. This court finds that all can be
read together and each given its proper effect. Under this
reading, the incentive to prompt settlement in § 113(f)(2)
remains intact; it simply is not the sole purpose of § 113
taken as a whole. By its terms, subsection 113(f)(1)
provides for contribution, subsection 113(f)(2) provides for
the termination of that interest as to settling PRPs, and
subsection 113(i) provides for intervention to protect that
and other interests of persons affected by the litigation.so
The Eighth Circuit applied the four elements of intervention 1 to
the facts of the case and concluded that the movants were entitled to
intervention by right. The court found the motion was timely.82 The court
also found that the movants had an interest relating to the transaction
which was the subject of the lawsuit: "[t]he threat of cutting off
contribution rights of non-settling PRPs creates a direct and immediate
interest on the part of non-settling PRPs in the subject matter of the
present litigation." 83 The movants' interest was to be impaired in that "the
prospective intervenors . . . [stood] to gain or lose by the direct legal

operation of the consent decree, which would subject their contribution
claims to the bar found in § 113(f)(2)." 84 In addition, the court found the
existing parties to the lawsuit did not adequately represent the movants'
interests.85 "Both the existing plaintiffs and existing defendants have an
interest in entry of the Consent Decree that is contrary to the interest of the

"Id.
at 1166.
80

id.

81 See

Part III.B, supranote 48 and accompanying text.
Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d at 1158-59.
83
Id. at 1167.
8 Id.
8
1Id. at 1168-70.
82
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intervenors who oVpose entry of the Consent Decree on the ground that it
is unfair to them."
IV. INSTANT DECISION

The court reviewed de novo the denial of Union Pacific's motion
to intervene as of right 87 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 and
CERCLA § 113." The court analyzed each prong of establishing an
intervention right-timeliness, sufficient interest, impairment of interest,
and adequate representation-and determined that Union Pacific satisfied
each requirement.8 9 Thus, Union Pacific had a right to intervene in the
government's lawsuit against the settling PRPs. 90
A. Timeliness
The timeliness of Union Pacific's motion to intervene was not
disputed. 9 1 Union Pacific filed its motion not long after the lawsuit was
filed and before any scheduling order was entered in the case.92 As a
result, the court found that Union Pacific's motion to intervene was

timely. 93
B. Sufficient Interest
The sufficiency of Union Pacific's interest was the central dispute
in the case. 94 The court first determined that Union Pacific had a resent
interest: the right to seek contribution from the settling PRPs. 9 T This
86

Id. at 1170.

87 United States v. Albert Inv. Co., 585 F.3d 1386, 1390 (10th Cir. 2009). Because
of its

conclusion regarding Union Pacific's right to intervene, the court did not address Union
Pacific's alternative argument regarding permissive intervention. Id. at 1399 ("Because
we find that Union Pacific has a right to intervene, we do not reach the district court's
denial
of the motion for permissive intervention.").
88
Id. at 1391.
89See id at 1392-99.
90
Id. at 1399.
9' Id. at 1392.
92 id

9 See id. at 1392.
94

d

9s Id. at 1397.
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interest related to the subject matter of the lawsuit. 96 Under San Juan
County, Union Pacific met the threshold requirement because its interest
could be adversely affected by the lawsuit. 97 Should the consent decree be
approved, Union Pacific's right to seek contribution from the settling
PRPs would be extinguished. 98
Union Pacific also satisfied San Juan County's practical judgment
standard. 99 In weighing the strength of Union Pacific's interest and its
potential risk of injury, "both point[ed] toward intervention."100 With
respect to the strength of Union Pacific's interest, the government seeks
approximately $23 million in cleanup costs from Union Pacific. 0 ' This
amount of potential liability constitutes a significant potential injury to
Union Pacific.102
In providing for contribution claims, CERCLA
recognizes that PRPs have an important interest in seeking contribution
from other PRPs to share such a burden.103 With respect to the potential
risk of injury to Union Pacific, "the risk of injury is great because judicial
approval will automatically cut off the right to seek contribution from the
settling defendants as PRPs."l 04
Just as Union Pacific's interest qualified as legally sufficient under
the San Juan County standard, it also comported with WildEarth
Guardians.0 5 Because Union Pacific's interest is monetary, and thus
economic in nature, it is "certainly sufficient for intervention as of
right."' 0 6 In summary, the court applied the San Juan County and
WildEarth Guardian standards to the intervention requirement of
sufficient interest and held that Union Pacific's interest in exercising its
contribution right against the settling defendants was sufficient to give rise
to intervention as of right.107
96

d
" Id. at 1398.
9' See
99

42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (2006).

Albert Inv. Co., 585 F.3d at 1398.
1oo Id.
10oId.
102

See id.

103id

'04 id.
id.
id.
107 See id. at 1392-98.
105
106 See
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The court also considered and dismissed four arguments made by
the government and the settling defendants. First, Appellees argued that
the CERCLA contribution right was "qualified" because the statute makes
it unavailable against settling defendants. 08 They interpreted CERCLA
§ 113(f) to mean that "[b]ecause CERCLA itself circumscribes the
contribution right that it creates ... Union Pacific's contribution right has
always been impaired."l 09 The court disagreed, holding that the
contribution right is available to Union Pacific unimpaired until the point
at which the defendants complete their settlement with the government.1 10
The impairment imposed by the statute is triggered by an event-the
settlement-which only serves to advance Union Pacific's argument that
"approval of the consent decree will certainly impair [its] right."I
Second, Appellees argued that the CERCLA intervention provision
(§ 113(i)) is ambiguous, and that because of this ambiguity, it was
appropriate for the court to consider legislative history the Appellees
claimed required the denial of intervention as of right.1 12 The court held
that § 113(i) was not ambiguous, and that in any event, the legislative
history did not support the denial of intervention as of right. 113 Appellees
failed to identify what language in § 113(i) was allegedly ambiguous,"l4
and the court rejected their argument that conflicting case law interpreting
the provision was sufficient to constitute a prima facie case of
ambiguity." The court found that "Section 113(i) is clear: any intervenor
must have an interest in the ongoing litigation, such that the outcome of
that case may impair that interest. Although this language is very broad, a
statute's breadth does not make it ambiguous."H 6
Id. at 1393 (citing Brief of Federal and State Appellees at 18, Albert Inv. Co., 585 F.3d
1386 (No. 08-6267), 2009 WL 1064876).
1o9 Id. (citing Brief of Federal and State Appellees at 18-19, Albert Inv. Co., 585 F.3d
1386 (No. 08-6267)).
" 0 Id. at 1394.
111 Id
112 Id. (citing Brief of Federal and State Appellees at 21-38, Albert Inv. Co., 585 F.3d
1386 (No. 08-6267)).
" Id. at 1395.
I14Id. at 1394.
1os

"s Id. at 1395.
16

Id.

135

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., VOL. 18, No. 1
The court was similarly unconvinced by the legislative history
upon which Appellees relied.' 17 Appellees pointed to proposed legislation
that would have narrowed the CERCLA intervention right,' 8 but these
versions were never passed.19 Because Congress declined to pass the
proposed legislation, the court concluded that "Congress intended the
broad intervention right that it created."l 20 Appellees also argued that
"general legislative intent" to encourage early settlement was incompatible
with intervention as of right in this context. 121 They claimed that "[i]f
non-settling PRPs could intervene in the action underlying the settlement
between other PRPs and the government, litigation expenses would
increase and . . . settlement incentives would decrease."'22

The court

determined that intervention was consistent with the promotion of prompt
settlement. 123 It concluded that allowing "a brief delay for the court to
consider a non-settling PRP's interest is not inconsistent with a general
goal of early settlement and might actually result in decreased litigation
costs."l24 Moreover, the court found that any concerns regarding delays
caused by intervention were addressed by the timeliness requirement. 2 5
The court also considered Congress' goal of ensuring that cleanup costs
are "borne by those responsible for the contamination"1 2 6 and found that
intervention furthers that goal by allowing intervening parties to argue
against a proposed settlement that would unfairly allocate costs.127

117
118

See id.
Id. (citing Brief of Federal and State Appellees at 23-24, Albert Inv. Co., 585 F.3d
1386 (No. 08-6267) (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-253(111), at 24 (1985), reprintedin 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3047)).
119 Id.
12 0 id
121 Id. (citing

Brief of Federal and State Appellees at 28-29, Albert Inv. Co., 585 F.3d
1386 (No. 08-6267)).
122 Id. (citing Brief of Federal and State Appellees at 28, Albert Inv. Co., 585 F.3d 1386
(No. 08-6267)).
123

Id. at 1396.

124

d
id.

125

126
127

Id. at 1397.
id.
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Third, Appellees argued that Union Pacific's interest was too
"remote, speculative and contingent" to justify intervention. 128 Appellees
pointed out that in order to actually recover funds from the settling
defendants, three variables must coincide: "Union Pacific must first be
found liable in the separate suit, be held liable for a disproportionate share
of the cleanup costs, and then establish the settling defendants'
liability."2 The court dismissed the speculation argument because Union
Pacific was not seeking to protect a "specific dollar value that it might
obtain from the settling defendants."' 30 Rather, Union Pacific sought to
protect a "substantive right that currently exists"-the right to seek
contribution from the settling defendants.131
Fourth, Appellees argued that Union Pacific's failure to participate
in settlement negotiations supported denial of intervention. 132 The court
found that Union Pacific's decision not to settle was irrelevant.' 3 3 Union
Pacific's intervention right arose when the other PRPs settled and the
government filed a lawsuit in order to lodge the consent decree.' 34 Its
timely motion to intervene preserved its interest in the suit and its right to
intervene, regardless of its settlement strategy.' 3 5
Thus, the court held that Union Pacific's right to seek contribution
from the settling PRPs constituted a legally sufficient interest for
intervention as of right.
C. Impairment ofInterest
The court then examined whether the disposition of the case (the
finalization of the consent decree) would impair Union Pacific's "ability to
Id. (citing Brief of Federal and State Appellees at 44-46, Albert Inv. Co., 585 F.3d
1386
(No. 08-6267)).
129 Id. (citing Brief of Federal and State Appellees at 44-45, Albert Inv.
Co., 585 F.3d
1386
(No.
08-6267)).
130 1d.
128

131Id.

Id. (citing Brief of Federal and State Appellees at 42-43, Albert Inv. Co., 585 F.3d
1386 (No. 08-6267)).
133
id.
134 id.
13 5 id.
132
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protect its interest, its statutory right to seek contribution."' 36 Under
CERCLA § 113(f)(2), "a settling party 'shall not be liable for claims for
contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement."" 3 7 Thus, the
finalization of the settlement would bar Union Pacific from seeking
contribution from the settling PRPs.' 3 8 The court concluded that "as a
practical matter, Union Pacific's interest may be impeded by the
disposition of the case," which satisfies the impairment of interest

requirement.139
The government argued that denying intervention would minimally
affect Union Pacific since intervention would merely allow Union Pacific
to brief the court, and not to veto the proposed settlement.1 40 The court
found that this argument "misstate[d] the purpose and requirements of
intervention as of right."' 4 1 The possibility that the court might decide
against Union Pacific's interest did not make Union Pacific any less
interested in, or affected by, the outcome of the case.142 The court noted
that Union Pacific was "only asking for a seat at the table"-the
opportunity to "fully participate as a party in the litigation." 43
The government also claimed that the notice and comment
The court
mechanism was "an adequate substitute for intervention.""
disagreed because the notice and comment mechanism lacks the
protections of intervention.145 The government and the court may legally
disregard comments received because the mechanism is not mandated by
statute.14 6 "The failure to consider adequately an intervenor's objections,

116 Id. at 1398.
'1 7 Id. (quoting
138Id.
1 Id.

42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (2006)).

40

Id. (citing Brief of Federal and State Appellees at 39, Albert nv. Co., 585 F.3d 1386
(No. 08-6267)).
1

14 1 id.
142

id

id
1" Id. (citing Brief of Federal and State Appellees at 39, Albert Inv. Co., 585 F.3d 1386
(No. 08-6267)).
143

45
1 Id. at

146

1398-99.
Id. at 1399.
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on the other hand, is subject to appellate review."1 4 7 Therefore, Union
Pacific is entitled to the procedural protections of intervention as of right.
D. Adequate Representation
Under CERCLA, the government must prove that the existing
parties to the litigation adequately represent the movant's interests.1 48 The
government conceded that Union Pacific's interests were not adequately
represented by the existing parties to the case.1 49 Thus, the court found
that Union Pacific met the fourth requirement for intervention as of right.
V. COMMENT

United States v. Albert Inv. Co. represents a step in the right
direction toward allowing non-settling PRPs to intervene in CERCLA
consent decree actions. The "majority" view that a non-settling PRP's
contribution right is too speculative an interest to give rise to a claim for
intervention as of right has outlived its utility. Allowing intervention as of
right is more likely to achieve just results while serving the overarching
policy goals of CERCLA.
Opponents of allowing intervention as of right argue that "allowing
intervention by nonsettlors would encourage recalcitrance by PRP[s], who
could refuse to engage in meaningful settlement negotiations and then stall
the court's approval of the consent decree by obtaining intervention."' 5 0
While possible, this result does not seem likely. Absent compelling
evidence brought by the non-settling PRP (in which case intervention has
served its function in preventing an unjust settlement), common sense
dictates that a court would not lightly reject a proposed consent decree
because of an intervenor's objection.
Practical considerations of
efficiency and expediency put intervenors at a significant disadvantage in
arguing against the proposed consent decree. At this stage of the lawsuit,
the government and the settling parties have concluded their negotiations
147 id
148 id

14 9

Id. (citing Brief of Federal and State Appellees at 16 n.7, Albert Inv. Co., 585 F.3d
1386 (No. 08-6257)); see 42 U.S.C. § 9613(i) (2006).
150 61 AM. JUR. 2d Pollution Control § 1325 (2010).
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and the comment period has closed. Rejecting the proposed consent
decree at this stage could undo every goal the lawsuit has realized,
resulting in additional work for the parties and the court.
As a result, the court has taken pains to clarify that the right of
intervention entitles the non-settling PRP to no more than an opportunity
to be heard. In United States v. ExxonMobil Corp., "the court cautioned
that the Intervenors faced 'a high hurdle in objecting to the proposed
Consent Decree.",15 The court clarified that it was not granting the
intervenor "veto power over the final settlement," but merely "a seat at the
table, and an opportunity to speak its piece."l 52 It seems unlikely that the
court would reject the proposed consent decree (or that an appellate court
would overturn the district court on appeal) absent genuine concerns
regarding the decree's fairness, in which case the settling parties would
have no legitimate basis for opposing a modification.
Consequently, it seems equally as unlikely that the availability of
intervention would encourage an intervenor to refuse to engage in
settlement discussions given the difficulty of persuading the court to reject
the proposed consent decree. If the intervenor most likely will not
succeed in challenging the proposed consent decree, foregoing the
opportunity to exert influence over the settlement process in reliance on
intervening later is an unreliable strategy. Rather, it is more likely that
parties who rejected settlement for reasons unrelated to the availability of
intervention will exercise the intervention right.
Allowing intervention as of right may increase the transactional
costs of consent decree actions if more non-settling PRPs move to
intervene as a result of the precedent set by Union Electric Co. and
151Meline

MacCurdy, Let Me In: District Court Allows Non-Settling Partiesto Intervene
in CERCLA ConsentDecree, MARTEN LAW ENVIRONMENTAL NEWS, Feb. 6, 2008,
http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20080206-non-settling-parties (quoting United
States v. ExxonMobil Corp., No. I:07-cv-00060, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95463, at *17
(D.N.H. Dec. 20, 2007)).
152 Id. (quoting ExxonMobil Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95463, at * 18). In this sense,
Union Pacific's victory in this case is limited given the likely difficulty of persuading the
court to reject the proposed consent decree. On the other hand, by gaining the right to
intervene, Union Pacific has also secured the right to appeal. The right to appeal serves
as an additional procedural safeguard as well as a (limited) strategic tool to a PRP
negotiating settlement with the government and seeking contribution from fellow PRPs.
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followed by Albert Inv. Co.153 Adding an intervenor to a case will
inevitably result in some delay and may necessitate supplementary
briefing, which requires additional expenditures of time and funds. It is
also possible that a losing intervenor would appeal. However, these
increased transactional costs are worth the price of a fair settlement given
CERCLA's policy goals.
Intervention as of right furthers CERCLA's primary policy goal:
to deter hazardous waste contamination.
[I]mposing liability has forward-looking deterrent effects in
addition to its providing a method to finance cleanup of
existing sites. Philip Cummings, the chief counsel of the
Senate Environmental Committee when CERCLA was
drafted, has written that this deterrent effect is at the heart
of the reasons for passage: "CERCLA," he writes, "is not
primarily an abandoned dump cleanup program, although
that is included in its purposes." Instead, "[t]he main
purpose of CERCLA is to make spills or dumping of
hazardous substances less likely through liability, enlisting
businesses and commercial instincts for the bottom line in
place of traditional regulation. It was a conscious intention
of the law's authors to draw lenders and insurers into this
new army of quasi-regulators, along with corporate risk
managers and boards of directors. [Cummings, Completing
the Circle, Envtl. Forum 11 (Nov./Dec. 1990).]"154
CERCLA effectuates deterrence by subjecting each PRP to liability for
cleanup costs and natural resources damages resulting from pollution
caused by that PRP. The most effective way to accomplish deterrence is
to fairly apportion liability according to each PRP's level of responsibility
for the contamination.
When the consequences meted to a PRP
proportionally mirror the PRP's behavior, the PRP has incentive to change
153See

Orford, supra note 4 (inferring that "it is possible that more non-settling PRPs will

challenge settlement agreements").
154 ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
POLICY 394 (6th ed. 2009).
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that behavior because it can control the outcome. Joint and several
liability' 55 can muddy the waters by imposing liability regardless of the
PRP's level of fault. In the event apportionment is not possible, the PRP
is liable for the "entire obligation"
regardless of whether that PRP
contributed ten drums or ten tons worth of waste to the site. Section 113's
cost recovery provision tempers the effect of joint and several liability by
allowing PRPs to sue each other for contribution to even the score.
Without intervention as of right, that contribution right can be severed
without affording the non-settling PRP the opportunity to recover a fair
amount of costs from fellow PRPs. Such a result would detract from the
deterrence mechanism established by CERCLA by divorcing a PRP's
behavior from that behavior's consequences.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged this "fairness" principle of
equating the extent of the PRP's contamination to the amount of costs
owed by the PRP. In its recent opinion in Burlington Northern & Santa
Fe Railroad Co. v. United States,157 the Court held that "where there is a
reasonable basis for apportionment, PRPs are only responsible for their
own contributions to contamination (leaving the government holding the
bag for any orphan share)."15 8 This holding creates a strong incentive for
the government to determine that liability cannot be apportioned in order
to avoid unfunded orphan shares. 1
Intervention as of right
counterbalances that incentive by allowing a non-settling PRP to hold the
government accountable for apportioning liability when possible, thus
strengthening CERCLA's deterrent effect.

155 "[E]ach

liable party is individually responsible for the entire obligation, but a paying
party may have a right of contribution and indemnity from nonpaying parties." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 933 (8th ed. 2004).
15 id.
157 129

S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
Orford, supra note 4 (citing Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1880-81).
159 In fact, Union Pacific raised this issue in its comments to the proposed consent decree,
arguing that the government failed to rationally apportion liability based on contribution
to the contamination. Union Pacific Co.'s Motion to Intervene, Ex A, United States v.
Albert Inv. Co., No. 08-CV-637 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 10, 2008). See also Orford, supra note
158
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VI. CONCLUSION

With its opinion in United States v. Albert Co., the Tenth Circuit
strengthens the "minority" position endorsed by the Eighth Circuit 60 of
allowing non-settling PRPs to intervene as of right in CERCLA § 107
consent decree litigations between the government and settling PRPs. The
court found that Union Pacific met the requirements for intervention under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 and CERCLA § 113 by (1) timely
moving to intervene in the consent decree action (2) in order to protect its
direct interest in recovering costs from the settling PRPs (3) when that
interest would be extinguished by the entry of the decree (4) and no party
in the action adequately protected Union Pacific's interests. The court
also held that the intervention mechanism is consistent with CERCLA's
other provisions and the statute's goal of encouraging prompt settlement.
In the interest of furthering the statute's overarching goal of deterring
future contamination, CERCLA must continue to promote equitable
distribution of cleanup costs among PRPs. Allowing intervention as of
right in consent decree actions provides non-settling PRPs a chance to be
heard regarding a potentially inequitable settlement before the nonsettlors' contribution rights are severed by that settlement. Thus, the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Albert Co. promotes equitable distribution of
cleanup costs among PRPs by bringing all parties to the litigation table.
Granting non-settlers an opportunity to challenge proposed consent
decrees is a step in the right direction toward a more equitable
implementation of CERCLA.
KATIE JO WHEELER
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See United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152, 1170 (8th Cir. 1995).
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